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Abstract 
It is often argued that Black-Scholes (1973) values overstate the subjective 
value of stock options granted to risk-averse and under-diversified execu-
tives. We construct a “representative” Swiss executive and extend the cer-
tainty-equivalence approach presented by Hall and Murphy (2002) to assess 
the value-cost wedge of executive stock options. Even with low coefficients 
of relative risk aversion, the discount can be above 50% compared to the 
Black-Scholes values. Regression analysis reveals that the equilibrium level 
of executive compensation is explained by economic determinant variables 
such as firm size and growth opportunities, whereas the managers’ pay-for-
performance sensitivity remains largely unexplained. Firms with larger 
boards of directors pay higher wages, indicating potentially unresolved 
agency conflicts. We reject the hypothesis that cross-sectional differences in 
the amount of executive pay vanish when risk-adjusted values are used as 
the dependent variable. 
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1 Introduction 
Not only in the US, but also in Continental Europe finance practice has increasingly used per-
formance-based compensation plans as a means to align the incentives of managers with those 
of shareholders (e.g., Frey and Osterloh, 2000). In addition to cash bonuses and share allot-
ments, stock options have emerged as a principal component of executive compensation. The 
arguments supporting the use of executive stock options are manifold.1 First, they motivate a 
firm’s executives and attract higher skilled and relatively less risk-averse managers, because 
these executives will naturally self-select into firms that offer more upside participation. Sec-
ond, options provide retention incentives through a combination of vesting provisions and 
long option terms. Third, managers tend to think like owners only by becoming owners. Eq-
uity-linked compensation alleviates principal-agent problems between managers and share-
holders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and provides incentives for executives to take share-
holder value maximizing actions. Finally, stock options allow firms to conserve cash and are 
therefore often regarded as “cheap” from an accounting perspective. However, with the intro-
duction of the IFRS 2 Share-Based Payment standard all stock option grants to employees 
must be expensed as of January 1, 2005.2 
While the benefits of equity-based compensation are well understood and widely accepted, it 
is surprising that its costs have received much less attention. After all, as noted by Meulbroek 
(2001), “[…] if the only result of equity-based compensation were incentive alignments, no 
natural stopping point would exist: managers’ compensation would be 100% equity-based.”3 
However, this is clearly not what is observed in practice, and there are several explanations. 
First, principle-agent models (e.g., Holmström, 1979; Harris and Raviv, 1979) emphasize the 
efficiency of high-powered incentive contracts, but they also recognize that there is a trade-off 
between incentives and risk sharing. Second, maybe the current pay-to-performance sensitiv-
ity is sufficient to motivate managers towards better performance.4 Third, stock options may 
encourage managers to take excessive risk because increases in the volatility of a company’s 
stock price increase the value of its options. However, managers with lots of at-the-money (or 
in-the-money) options could become overly cautious, unwilling to jeopardize a large antici-
pated payoff that will accrue even if the stock price increases at just the T-bill rate.5 Finally, 
there is a potential disparity between the cost of an option grant and the value of that grant to 
the manager. This value-cost wedge depends on a number of factors, including the degree of 
diversification in the executive’s portfolio, the length of the vesting period of the option, and 
the risk aversion of the executive. For example, Meulbroek (2001) documents that managers 
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in the average NYSE firm value their options at only 70% of the market value. Hall and Mur-
phy (2002) argue that the growth in risk-adjusted pay has been modest in the US over the last 
decade, suggesting that executive value has increased far less than company cost. 
For options to achieve their stated objectives, the recipients must not be allowed to trade the 
options or take actions such as short-selling company stock or to otherwise hedge company 
stock price risk.6 While exposure to firm-specific risk is essential for generating managerial 
incentives, it also imposes economic costs by forcing the recipients to hold a less-than-fully 
diversified investment portfolio. In fact, executives are forced (by vesting requirements, in-
sider sales restrictions, or board pressure) to hold more company equity than is desirable from 
a portfolio diversification viewpoint.7 Managers’ human capital investment in the firm and 
pension fund holdings that are strongly related to the company’s stock further increase their 
idiosyncratic risk exposure. Overall, there is an inevitable trade-off between incentive align-
ment and portfolio diversification, and managers will discount the value of their company 
equity holdings because of this suboptimal risk sharing. 
In the first part of this paper, we focus on the common argument that Black-Scholes (1973) 
values are too high, i.e., when opportunity costs are taken into account, stock options are an 
expensive way to convey pay. Black-Scholes values provide an estimate of the company’s 
cost of granting an option, but they do not reflect the value of a non-tradable option to risk 
averse and undiversified executives. We use the Hall-Murphy (2002) certainty-equivalence 
approach and estimate the deadweight costs for a sample of Swiss firms using stock options 
as part of their compensation packages. Switzerland is an interesting case to analyze. First, the 
institutionalization of shareholdings has had a strong effect on the structural changes of the 
equity market after pension plans became mandatory in the mid-eighties and emerged as the 
major domestic investment force. Drobetz et al. (2006) report that institutional investors hold 
almost 50% of all assets deposited with Swiss banks. On the one hand, institutional investors 
could promote the efficient use of executive stock options, but on the other hand, they should 
have incentives to exert control. In fact, their own monitoring activities might substitute for 
the use of stock option plans as part of the firm’s optimal control structure. Second, while the 
market for corporate control developed slowly during the 1990s (e.g., Loderer and Zgraggen, 
1999), there have been serious attempts by Swiss firms to adopt internationally recognized 
corporate governance principles in recent years. The adoption of executive stock option plans 
has been a central part of this development in corporate Switzerland (e.g., Beiner et al., 2006). 
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In the second part of this paper, we take a closer look at the relationship between the level of 
executive compensation (including stock options) and the quality of the firm’s corporate gov-
ernance. Most previous work on executive stock options regards managers’ pay arrangements 
as a (partial) remedy to the agency problem (e.g., Baker, Jensen, and Murphy, 1988; Jensen 
and Murphy, 1990). The rise in executive compensation can be attributed to the widespread 
adoption of compensation packages with high-powered incentives since the late 1980s. This 
view is referred to as the “optimal contracting approach” or “arm’s length approach”. Re-
cently, however, Bebchuk and Fried (2003) have argued that executive compensation should 
not only be interpreted as an instrument for addressing agency problems, but it should also be 
viewed as part of the agency problem itself. The “managerial power approach” suggests that 
managers’ pay arrangements are determined both by market forces that provide efficient in-
centives and assure value-maximizing outcomes and by managerial rent-seeking under weak 
corporate governance structures, which leads to departures from the optimal outcome and 
generally benefits managers.8 To shed light on this prediction, we explore whether firms with 
weak control structures in place have greater agency problems and pay a higher compensation 
to their managers. 
Our results indicate that the value-cost wedge can be substantial. For example, even for low 
relative risk aversion coefficients of 2 and 3, we estimate discounts from the Black-Scholes 
values of 47% and 62%, respectively, if all outstanding option packages as of year-end 2002 
are included in our analysis. In absolute terms, this translates into deadweight losses of CHF 
290 million and CHF 377 million. Our regression results indicate that the equilibrium level of 
executive pay is explained by economic determinant variables such as firm size and growth 
opportunities), while board and ownership variables hardly impact the level of total compen-
sation. Nevertheless, firms with larger boards of directors pay higher wages to their execu-
tives, indicating potentially unresolved agency problems. In contrast, the pay-for-performance 
sensitivity is unrelated to both the economic determinant variables as well as to our board and 
ownership variables. Finally, we reject the hypothesis that the cross-sectional differences in 
the level of executive pay vanish when risk-adjusted values are employed. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly introduces the certainty-
equivalence framework proposed by Hall and Murphy (2002). The section continues with a 
data description and documents our estimates for the value-cost wedge. Section 3 starts with 
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some general considerations about the relationship between corporate governance and execu-
tive compensation and proceeds with our regression results. Section 4 concludes the paper. 
2 Estimating the value-cost wedge of executive stock options 
The Black-Scholes (1973) model or similar option pricing methodologies are appropriate for 
freely tradable options held by outside investors. However, they are inappropriate for execu-
tives who cannot trade or sell their options and are not allowed to hedge specific risks by 
short-selling company stock. This would eliminate the primary purpose of the option grants, 
i.e., to align the financial interests of the managers with those of the shareholders. In addition, 
company executives are inherently undiversified because they hold too much of their physical 
and human capital in their company.9 To assess option values for undiversified executives, we 
adopt the certainty-equivalence approach presented by Hall and Murphy (2002). Already 
Lambert et al. (1991) suggest that the standard option pricing models are inappropriate to de-
termine the value of executive stock options. In particular, it is crucial to distinguish between 
the economic cost to the company (i.e., the amount the company could have received if the 
option was sold to outside investors) and the economic value to a less-than-fully diversified 
executive, who can neither trade the option nor otherwise diversify firm-specific risk.10 
Following Hall and Murphy (2002), we measure the value of a non-tradable option to an un-
diversified executive as the amount of riskless cash compensation a recipient would exchange 
for the option. Option values generally depend on six factors: exercise price, stock price, divi-
dend yield, volatility, risk-free rate, and maturity. Hall and Murphy (2002) introduce “execu-
tive value lines”, which plot the certainty equivalents of non-tradable options to undiversified 
executives as a function of the underlying stock price. Their analysis shows that the certainty-
equivalent value depends on three additional factors: the manager’s risk aversion, his initial 
wealth, and the fraction of his wealth that is tied to firm performance. 
In this section, we estimate the magnitude of the wedge between the subjective value that an 
executive places on an option and the company cost of the same option for a sample of Swiss 
firms. Given the peculiarities of Swiss disclosure rules, we adjust the Hall-Murphy frame-
work. We describe the disclosure rules and our data set in section 2.1, and proceed by explain-
ing our model extensions in section 2.2. The empirical results are presented in section 2.3. 
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2.1 Disclosure rules and data sample 
Recently, many European countries have adopted new standards, rules, or codes of best prac-
tice to establish guidelines for listed companies and to improve the overall level of corporate 
governance. In Switzerland the “Directive on Information Relating to Corporate Governance” 
of the Swiss Exchange and the accompanying “Swiss Code of Best Practice” became effective 
as of July 1, 2002. This new set of rules is assumed to reflect best practice, but they are not 
legally binding and require disclosure on a comply-or-explain basis. Section 5 of the directive 
recommends that companies disclose information on compensation and shareholdings. Gener-
ally, they ought to “[…] disclose the total of all compensation such as honorariums, salaries, 
credits, bonuses and benefits in kind that […] directly and indirectly benefited members of the 
board of directors and/or the management board.”11 In what follows, we refer to the members 
of the board of directors and the management board simply as “executives”. In addition to the 
total of all compensation, companies are urged to provide more detailed information and dis-
close the number of shares that are allotted to and held by each executive. Companies are also 
urged to provide an overview of the options on shares that are held by the group of execu-
tives, including information about the allotment year, the vesting period, the subscription ratio 
and the exercise price. The directive does not require individualized information, but it merely 
specifies that firms must report ownership and compensation figures on an aggregate level for 
executives and executive directors on the board as well as for non-executive directors. Lack-
ing individualized information about compensation structures, we study a “representative” 
Swiss executive (section 2.2 below).12 
We target all 235 companies of the Swiss Performance Index (excluding investment compa-
nies). For the sample period, complete datasets are available for only 173 listed firms.13 Based 
on the annual reports for the reporting year 2002, we find that 80 firms explicitly state that 
they use stock options, and 70 firms report that they generally do not allot stock options. The 
disclosure of the remaining 23 firms is incomplete, and these firms are omitted. Out of the 80 
option granting firms, there are 2 firms that issue options where the underlying stock is traded 
in Swiss francs, but the strike price is in US dollars.14 The final sample consists of 78 firms 
with a total of 333 outstanding option packages, where 98 packages were granted in 2002 
(i.e., the first reporting year during which the new disclosure rules applied), and the remaining 
235 outstanding packages were allotted already before 2002. Compensation data were gath-
ered from the annual reports, and all other data were obtained from the Datastream database. 
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2.2 Model adjustments 
To calculate the value-cost wedge, we estimate what Hall and Murphy (2002) call the “risk-
adjusted pay”. To put their framework at work with Swiss data, we start with an assumption 
about the initial wealth of an executive, denoted as w. Lacking individualized compensation 
data, we define the risk-free wealth of a company’s executive as follows: 
(1) w = max R ⋅ 5'000'000, 4 ⋅Cash( ), 
where R denotes the number of firm executives eligible for equity-based compensation, and 
Cash is the amount of total cash compensation (including cash bonuses and other cash com-
ponents) they receive. This assumption implies that, on average, an executive’s safe wealth is 
assumed to be the greater of CHF 5 million or four times total cash compensation.15 Hall and 
Murphy’s (2002) approach can be generalized to incorporate several option packages. In addi-
tion to non-firm related wealth of w, assume that the executive holds s shares of company 
stock and is granted n options to buy n shares of stock at exercise price X in T years. If the 
executive’s initial wealth is invested at the risk-free rate, rf, and the stock price at maturity is 
PT, his end-of-period wealth is: 
(2) WT ≡ w−R 1+ rf( )T + s ⋅ PT−R + n j−R ⋅max 0,PT − X j( )∑ + ni−R ⋅max 0,PT − Xi( )∑ , 
where the summation terms allow for different option packages granted before 2002 (type j) 
and in 2002 (type i), respectively. Comparing the notation in equation (2) to that in Hall and 
Murphy (2002), there are two differences. First, lacking individualized compensation data, we 
divide by the number of executives eligible for equity-based compensation, R, to obtain aver-
age figures. This representative agent approach clearly underestimates the deadweight loss for 
the CEO of a company, who is supposedly the best paid company executive. Nevertheless, the 
bias should be mitigated given that we observe that stock option allotments are much more 
evenly distributed among the executives in our Swiss sample than in the US. Second, we can-
not discount cash bonuses to account for their implied risk because firms are not required to 
disclose separate information. However, note that the initial wealth, w, in equation (1) already 
incorporates total cash compensation (including cash bonuses and other cash components). 
If, instead of the option, the manager was awarded V in cash (to be compounded at the risk-
free rate), his wealth at time T is defined as: 
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(3) WT
V ≡ w +V( )−R ⋅ 1+ rf( )T + s ⋅ PT−R + n j−R ⋅max 0,PT − X j( )∑ . 
The specification in equation (3) still contains all options granted before 2002 (type j) and 
would be appropriate if we were to distinguish between different years of allotment and only 
evaluate the value-cost wedge for options granted during the reporting year 2002. However, to 
exploit our relatively small sample size, we analyze all 333 outstanding option packages as of 
year-end 2002 separately. Therefore, we compute the certainty equivalent, V, for each option 
package (both type i and j) by taking the average executive’s wealth at time T as: 
(4) WT
V ≡ w +V( )−R ⋅ 1+ rf( )T + s ⋅ PT−R . 
As described in Hall and Murphy (2002), we assume that an executive’s utility over wealth is 
U(W) with constant relative risk aversion. We measure the value of a non-tradable option to 
an undiversified executive as the amount of riskless cash compensation the recipient would 
exchange for the option. An executive’s risk adjusted compensation is the certainty equivalent 
V that equates the expected utilities in equation (3) in Hall and Murphy (2002).16 We further 
assume that the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) holds. The distribution of stock prices 
in T years is lognormal with return volatility σ and expected return, μ, as given by:  
(5) μ = E r( )= rf + β ⋅ rm − rf( )−σ 2 2( )⋅T  
Based on the historical properties of the Swiss stock market (Drobetz, 2001), we assume that 
rf = 4.5% and rm − rf = 5.5% (equity risk premium). We use firm-specific volatilities and be-
tas, where the former are computed using each firm’s monthly stock returns over the period 
from January 1999 to December 2002, and the latter are based on market model regressions 
involving the Swiss Performance Index (SPI) over the same time period. We further assume 
that a firm maintains the average 1999 to 2002 annual dividend yield until the options expire. 
2.3 Risk-adjusted pay in Switzerland 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the compensation packages for our sample firms dur-
ing the reporting year 2002. All figures are market values, and they have to be interpreted as 
costs incurred by the firms and not as values for executives or directors. The average execu-
tive compensation in our sample for 2002 is CHF 753’975. The distribution is heavily skewed 
to the right, as indicated by the much lower median compensation (CHF 410’713) as well as 
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the minimum and the maximum compensation values.17 Roughly 68% (CHF 511’392) of the 
average total compensation are paid out in cash. As mentioned earlier, cash includes cash 
compensation, cash bonuses and other compensation components paid out in cash. Another 
10% (CHF 74’152) are paid in the form of company stock. Company stock is valued at 2002 
year-end prices. The remaining 22% (CHF 168’431) of the compensation were paid out by 
granting stock options. Stock options are valued using the Black-Scholes (1973) option pric-
ing formula and year-end 2002 stock prices. 
[Insert table 1 here] 
The figures in table 1 represent the cost of a compensation package from a company perspec-
tive. A value-cost wedge arises if the recipient of the option cannot trade nor hedge against 
adverse stock price movements and is less-than-optimally diversified from a portfolio diversi-
fication viewpoint. Figure 1 shows the average Black-Scholes (market) values and the average 
risk-adjusted values of the option package for the “representative” Swiss executive, depend-
ing on the year of grant (either in 2002 or before) and his coefficient of relative risk aversion, 
denoted as ρ. As expected, the executive value of the average option packages decreases 
strictly with risk aversion. Looking at all option packages together (granted in 2002 or be-
fore), even with a moderate risk aversion of ρ = 2, the subjective value of an option package 
decreases by 49% (from CHF 482’878 to CHF 244’002), on average. Considering only option 
packages allotted in 2002, the value decrease amounts to 41%. An increase in the coefficient 
of relative risk aversion to ρ = 3 leads to subjective value losses of 62% and 57% for all op-
tion packages and those granted in 2002, respectively. With a fairly high coefficient of rela-
tive risk aversion of ρ = 10, the option package becomes almost worthless – compared to the 
Black-Scholes value, an executive discounts the options by 89%. In this case, it is hard to ar-
gue that there are any incentive alignment effects remaining at all. However, because stock 
options, on average, make up a much smaller proportion of total compensation than cash, the 
decrease in executive value of total pay is less pronounced. All else equal, total compensation 
decreases by 9.2% and 12.7% with ρ = 2 and ρ = 3, respectively. This implies that the relative 
fraction of stock options as part of the total compensation package decreases from 22% using 
Black-Scholes values to 14.5% (with ρ = 2) or 11.1% (with ρ = 3) in the certainty-equivalent 
framework. 
[Insert figure 1 here] 
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Instead of looking at the “representative” Swiss executive, we can also asses the aggregate 
deadweight costs incurred by the allotment of executive stock options. Figure 2 shows the 
aggregate Black-Scholes and risk-adjusted option values, obtained by summing up our previ-
ous results over all 98 option packages allotted in 2002 by our 78 sample firms. Note that this 
approach is crude at best and ignores personal cross-linkages that exist between the compa-
nies’ boards. Such cross-linkages are the rule rather than the exception in Switzerland, and 
therefore the following numbers should only be taken as approximations. The direction of this 
bias is hard to predict. On the one hand, more options should imply lower value-cost ratios. 
On the other hand, a manager who serves on the board of several companies may also experi-
ence diversification benefits. Using Black-Scholes values, the total aggregate compensation 
for 2002 amounts to roughly CHF 947 million. From this total aggregate, 64% were paid out 
in cash (including cash bonuses and all other cash components), 12% through stock allot-
ments, and 24% in stock options. Adjusting the option component, but all else equal, with a 
risk aversion of with ρ = 2 and ρ = 3 the risk-adjusted total compensation reduces to CHF 858 
million and CHF 820 million, respectively. 
[Insert figures 2 and 3 here] 
Figure 3 shows the Black-Scholes value of all outstanding option packages (granted in 2002 
and before) and compares it with the risk-adjusted values. The Black-Scholes value of all out-
standing option packages as of year-end 2002 amounts to CHF 612 million. Assuming risk 
aversion coefficients of ρ = 2 and ρ = 3, the reductions are 47% and 62%, respectively. These 
risk-adjustments imply aggregate deadweight losses of CHF 290 million (for ρ = 2) and CHF 
377 million (for ρ = 3). Clearly, while these figures appear large in absolute values, they ap-
pear small when put into a relevant context. For example, they account for merely 0.05% and 
0.07% of aggregate sample market capitalization (as of year-end 2002), respectively. Looking 
only at options granted in 2002, the reductions are 36% (for ρ = 2) and 56% (for ρ = 3), im-
plying aggregate deadweight losses of CHF 88 million and CHF 126 million, translating into 
0.01% and 0.02% of aggregate sample market capitalization, respectively. 
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3  Corporate governance and executive compensation 
3.1  Methodological approach and variable description 
In spite of the value-cost wedge, executive stock options are widely considered as a means to 
alleviate the agency problem in public companies. In addition to measuring the true costs of 
executive stock options, therefore, a closely related question is whether firms allot options 
efficiently, given their operative environment and corporate control structure. In their mana-
gerial power approach, Bebchuk and Fried (2003) suggest that executive pay will be higher 
and/or less sensitive to performance when managers have more power and are able to extract 
rents. Based on this notion, in this section we explore whether firms with weak corporate 
governance structures have greater agency problems and pay their managers a higher com-
pensation. 
As in Core et al. (1999), we use total executive compensation as a metric for assessing the 
effectiveness of corporate governance and assume that, among other corporate control mecha-
nisms, managers’ power depends on board and ownership structures. A caveat is that 
corporate governance structures and managerial incentive compensation arise simultaneously 
and endogenously.18 We start with the null hypothesis that observed ownership and board 
structures induce optimal contracting and firm performance. Shareholders must choose both 
the firm’s corporate governance structure and the executive compensation contracts to maxi-
mize firm value, given the firm’s operative environment and the reservation wage for a man-
ager of a given quality. However, costs and benefits of corporate governance mechanism dif-
fer across firms, and therefore firms will deliberately vary in adopting these mechanisms. For 
example, Smith and Watts (1992) claim that larger firms and firms with greater investment 
opportunities are more complex operations and are more likely to demand higher-quality 
managers with higher equilibrium wages. If the observed ownership and board structures 
bring about optimal manager contracting, the economic determinants of the level of executive 
pay will perfectly describe the cross-sectional variation in the equilibrium level of executive 
compensation. In a properly specified regression model, the null hypothesis is that only vari-
ables that determine the firm’s demand for a manager of a given quality should have explana-
tory power. Ownership and board variables should not be estimated significantly in such a 
model because they do not carry information beyond the firm characteristics that eventually 
determine optimal executive compensation.19 
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In contrast, if the ownership and/or board variables are estimated significantly in the compen-
sation regression, one potential explanation is that the null hypothesis can be rejected and that 
there are unresolved agency problems. This evidence for managerial entrenchment could be 
interpreted as support for the managerial power hypothesis. However, an equally plausible 
interpretation is that there is an omitted variables problem, implying that the model for equi-
librium compensation (omitting ownership and board variables) is misspecified. This problem 
occurs if the economic determinants cannot fully explain the equilibrium level of executive 
compensation and/or if the ownership and board variables proxy for the (unobserved) under-
lying economic determinants.20 
As in Core et al. (1999), the dependent variable in our main regression is the logarithm of the 
total compensation (the sum of salary, bonus, and options and stock grants) of the “represen-
tative” executive in each firm. To model the equilibrium level of executive pay, we employ a 
set of economic determinants that reflect the range of managerial discretion across firms in 
our sample. Table 2 contains a description of all variables. We use sales to proxy for firm size 
and complexity (Size), and the firm’s market-to-book ratio is a proxy for its investment oppor-
tunity set (Growth).21 In addition, we employ firm age (Age), the operating profit (return on 
assets, Profitability), the company stock return (Stock return), and firm risk (Sigma), meas-
ured as the standard deviation of the firm’s stock return, and a dummy variable for inclusion 
in the Swiss Market Index (SMI), to model the costs and benefits of using different executive 
compensation contracts.  
[Insert table 2 here] 
The model in John and John (1993) predicts that firms with higher leverage (Leverage) will 
find it optimal to reduce the incentives provided by stock options in order to reduce the ex-
pected agency costs of debt (e.g., risk shifting). Jensen (1986) and Easterbrook (1986) argue 
that firms with higher leverage and higher dividend yields (Dividend yield) are more closely 
monitored, and stronger market monitoring may be consistent with lower equilibrium wages. 
In contrast, Yermack (1995) argues that firms that omit paying dividends face liquidity con-
straints and substitute stock options for straight salary in the compensation packages. Finally, 
to control for differences in managerial discretion and the demand for managerial talent across 
industries (e.g., Demsetz und Lehn, 1985), we use seven industry dummy variables according 
to the classification of Swiss Exchange and estimate an industry fixed effects model. 
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To disentangle the optimal contracting approach from the managerial power hypothesis, we 
include a set of ownership and board variables in the compensation regression, along with the 
hypothesized economic determinants. The ownership variables are: (i) the percentage of vot-
ing rights exercised by the largest shareholder (Lshare), (ii) the percentage of equity owned 
by officers and directors (Stocksod), and (iii) the percentage of cumulated voting rights exer-
cised by large outside investors with more than 5 percent of the voting rights (Blockout). In 
line with the view that the presence of a large outside shareholder encourages closer monitor-
ing by virtue of a takeover threat (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1986), the model in Cyert et al. 
(2002) predicts a negative relationship between equity compensation and ownership of the 
largest shareholder. Based on Jensen and Meckling’s (1984) seminal analysis, Mehran (1995), 
Core et al. (1999), and Cyert et al. (2002) document that incentives provided by stock options 
decrease if the executives’ personal stock ownership increases. Hartzell and Starks (2003) 
provide evidence that the presence of institutional investors increases the pay-for-performance 
sensitivity and decreases the level of compensation.22 The variable Blockout captures mainly 
ownership of large pension funds and mutual funds, and we use it to test whether institutional 
investors limit manager pay. 
The variables related to the board of directors are: (i) board size (Bsize), (ii) a dummy variable 
indicating whether the CEO is also the chairman of the board (Ceoc), and (iii) outside mem-
bership on the board, measured as the percentage of board seats held by non-officers without 
any relationship to the founding family (Outsider). Jensen (1993) and Yermack (1996) sug-
gest that the size of the board of directors is associated with less effective board monitoring 
because larger boards are less effective due to director free-riding and more susceptible to the 
influence of the CEO.23 Yermack (1996) also provides evidence for more pronounced agency 
problems under CEO duality. The model in Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) predicts that CEO 
turnover is more sensitive to performance when the board is more independent. Shivdasani 
and Yermack (1999) and Beiner et al. (2006) document that the concentration of power asso-
ciated with CEO duality leads to the election of less independent board members. Consistent 
with these findings, Core at al. (1999) report that the level of executive pay is positively re-
lated to board size and CEO duality, and negatively related to the number of outside directors. 
Bebchuk and Fried (2003) suggest that the managerial power hypothesis not only refers to the 
level of total executive compensation but also the pay-for-performance sensitivity. Therefore, 
as in Yermack (1995) and Hartzell and Starks (2003), we also estimate our regression model 
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using a measure for the steepness of the relationship between executive pay and shareholder 
wealth as the dependent variable. Following Yermack’s (1995) technique, we compute the 
option-grant sensitivity by calculating the delta of every option grant, ∂C/∂P (where C is the 
value of the call option and P is the price of the stock), using the Black and Scholes (1973) 
model. We multiply the delta of the options by the number of options granted and divide by 
the total number of shares outstanding at the beginning of 2002. We then multiply by 1’000 to 
get the Swiss franc change in managerial wealth per CHF 1’000 change in shareholder wealth. 
The average option grant-sensitivity in our sample is CHF 0.44 per CHF 1’000, with a median 
of CHF 0.05 and a standard deviation of CHF 1.01. These figures for Switzerland are smaller 
than Yermack’s (1995) mean and median of $0.59 and $0.07 per $1’000 for US data, respec-
tively. Because options make up only a small portion of total managerial compensation in our 
sample, we use a measure for the total (weighted) pay-for-performance sensitivity, which is 
computed using the relative weights of cash, stock, and options in each payment package. 
With this alternative measure, the steepness of the relationship between total compensation 
and shareholder wealth decreases to only CHF 0.14 per CHF 1’000 change in shareholder 
wealth, on average, with a median of CHF 0.02 and a standard deviation of CHF 0.37.24 
Hall and Murphy (2002) argue that the certainty-equivalent approach adjusts for the riskiness 
of a manager’s pay and the degree of personal under-diversification. To test this hypothesis, 
we rerun the level of pay regressions using the economic determinant variables and an addi-
tional dummy variable, which is one if the firm’s executives belong to the top 10 percent in 
terms of total pay (Top10p), and zero otherwise. We identify the top 10 percent earners on the 
basis of the market values of their compensation packages. By construction, the coefficient on 
the dummy variable Top10p must be positive in regressions where the market value of a com-
pensation package is used as the independent variable. The more interesting question is 
whether the estimated coefficient decreases in magnitude when the risk-adjusted value of the 
firm’s compensation package is used as the dependent variable.25 If the high compensation 
packages received by the top earners are attributable to the riskiness of their pay and/or less 
than optimal personal diversification, then in the presence of the determinant variables for the 
equilibrium level of manager pay, the null hypothesis is that the dummy variable Top10p is no 
longer estimated significantly when risk-adjusted values of executive pay are used. To test the 
(less stringent) hypothesis that the estimated coefficients on the dummy variable Top10p are 
identical irrespective of whether market values or risk adjusted values of total compensation 
are used as dependent variable, we estimate a system of simultaneous equations using Zell-
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ner’s (1963) seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) technique. The explanatory variables are 
the same in all equations, i.e., the economic determinant variables in addition to Top10p, and 
therefore the estimated coefficients using SUR are identical to OLS. However, because the 
error terms are correlated across equations and SUR estimates the full variance-covariance 
matrix of the coefficients, it is possible to perform joint coefficient tests. 
3.2  Regression results 
Table 3 summarizes our regression results. Column I contains the results from industry fixed 
effects regressions using the economic determinant variables together with the ownership and 
board variables. Consistent with the predictions of Gabaix and Landier’s (2006) model, total 
executive pay increases with firm size (Size), presumably because size is a proxy for complex-
ity and the demand for better qualified managers.26 As in Smith and Watts (1992), our results 
suggest that firms with more growth opportunities (Growth) require more skilled managers 
and use more incentive plans, and they will possibly pay higher equilibrium wages. Agency 
theory predicts that the level of manager pay will be an increasing function of firm perform-
ance (e.g., Jensen and Murphy, 1990), explaining the significantly positive coefficient on the 
annual stock market return (Stock return). Finally, older firms (Age) tend to pay lower wages. 
While all other variables used to model equilibrium wages are estimated insignificantly, over-
all these results for our small sample of Swiss firms are consistent with previous empirical 
evidence (e.g., Core et al., 1999).27 
Contradicting John and John’s (1993) notion that firms with higher leverage will reduce the 
incentives provided by stock options to reduce the expected agency costs of debt, Leverage is 
estimated significantly positive in column I. Lewellen et al. (1987) also report a positive rela-
tionship, but Yermack (1995) cannot detect a significant association between financial lever-
age and incentives from stock options. The coefficient on Dividend yield is estimated insig-
nificantly. This result could be explained by two opposing effects. On the one hand, firms that 
omit paying dividends face liquidity constraints and substitute stock options for straight salary 
in the compensation packages (e.g., Yermack, 1995), but on the other hand firms with high 
payout ratios are more closely monitored by the market, inducing reduced managerial discre-
tion and arguably lower equilibrium wages (e.g., Easterbrook, 1986). 
[Insert table 3 here] 
16 
Looking at the board and ownership variables, only the coefficient of Bsize is estimated sig-
nificantly positive. This result is consistent with Jensen’s (1993) ad-hoc notion that larger 
boards induce reduced monitoring due to director free-riding as well as the empirical results 
in Core et al. (1999), who document that CEO compensation is higher when the board is lar-
ger. Assuming that the level of equilibrium executive compensation is correctly specified, this 
result could be interpreted as providing support for Bebchuk and Friend’s (2003) managerial 
power hypothesis, i.e., that managerial entrenchment leads to higher executive pay. However, 
the estimated coefficients on all other ownership and board variables do not provide further 
insights. The insignificant coefficient on Lshare could again be explained by two opposing 
effects. On the one hand, the presence of a large shareholder leads to better monitoring and 
lower executive compensation (e.g., Cyert, 2002), but on the other hand a controlling share-
holder can appropriate private benefits not shared by other shareholders of the firm (e.g., Bar-
clay and Holderness, 1989). The firm’s management is usually hired and fired by the control-
ling shareholder, and often the two parties coincide, which arguably leads to higher executive 
compensation. The insignificant coefficient on managerial ownership (Stocksod) agrees with 
the results in Lewellen et al. (1987) and Yermack (1995), but it does not support the inverse 
relationship documented by Mehran (1995), Core et al. (1999), and Cyert et al. (2002). Al-
though the estimated coefficient carries the expected sign, our results cannot confirm Hartzell 
and Starks’ (2003) finding that institutional ownership (Blockout) is significantly negatively 
related to the level of compensation due to closer monitoring and greater scrutiny of manag-
ers. A positive coefficient on Ceoc suggests that CEO duality leads to managerial entrench-
ment and higher executive compensation, and the negative coefficient on Outsider indicates 
that outside directors presumably make boards more independent and limit manager pay. 
However, in contrast to Core et al. (1999), both relationships are estimated insignificantly.28 
Columns II shows the results when the total pay-for-performance (PFP) sensitivity is used as 
the dependent variable. To the extent that our economic determinant variables proxy for the 
expected agency costs of the firm, observing that these variables are generally estimated in-
significantly could indicate that firms do not follow optimal compensation practices. Jensen 
and Murphy (1990) and Yermack (1995) also document that the performance incentives of 
stock options have only a weak association with explanatory variables related to agency cost 
reduction. Similar to Bizjak et al. (1993) and Yermack (1995), we report a negative (albeit 
insignificant) relationship between growth opportunities (Growth) and the total pay for per-
formance sensitivity. This result is surprising because growth opportunities are generally as-
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sumed to proxy for higher information asymmetries and more pronounced agency costs, pre-
sumably requiring a higher pay-for-performance sensitivity (e.g., Hartzell and Starks, 2003). 
The significantly negative coefficient on Outsider is also hard to explain. Theory suggests that 
the presence of outside directors will lead to more efficient compensation contracts with 
higher pay-for-performance sensitivity. Moreover, we cannot replicate Hartzell and Starks’ 
(2003) finding that the firm’s pay-for-performance sensitivity is significantly positively re-
lated to the concentration of institutional ownership. The coefficient on Blockout is estimated 
insignificantly. Overall, it may nevertheless be premature to blame Swiss firms’ that they do 
not follow optimal compensation practices, which could be one explanation for our weak re-
sults when the pay-for-performance sensitivity is used as the dependent variable. Although the 
set of explanatory variables follows previous research, it is equally possible that our regres-
sion model is misspecified. The adjusted R-square drops from 54% in the level of pay regres-
sion in column I to only 9% in column II, and the only governance variable that is estimated 
significantly, Outsider, could be correlated with the (unobserved) underlying economic de-
terminants. 
Finally, columns III-V show the results of our system of equations that omits the ownership 
and board variables, but includes the dummy variable Top10p, which is one if the firm’s ex-
ecutives belong to the top 10% in terms of total pay, and zero otherwise. Using the market 
value and the risk-adjusted values of executive compensation (with ρ = 3 and ρ = 10) as the 
dependent variables, we estimate the resulting system of equations using SUR. A first obser-
vation is that Dividend yield is now estimated significantly negative, supporting Easterbrook’s 
(1986) notion that firms with higher payout ratios are more closely monitored. Our main hy-
pothesis, however, is that if we adjust for the riskiness of equity-based compensation pack-
ages and poor diversification, the coefficient on Top10p decreases with increasing relative 
risk aversion (or even becomes insignificant). As predicted, the estimated coefficient on 
Top10p decreases (from 1.17 using market values to 1.07 in the certainty-equivalent setup 
with ρ = 10), but it nevertheless remains statistically significant even in the presence of our 
control variables. The coefficient on Top10p in column III indicates that the average pay of 
executives in the 10% highest paying Swiss firms is 222% higher than in other firms, on aver-
age.29 Looking at the estimated coefficients in columns IV and V, the average total pay of the 
top earning executives is still 206% and 192% higher than that of the other firms in the sam-
ple assuming ρ = 3 and ρ = 10, respectively. A Wald coefficient test (reported at the bottom 
of the table) cannot reject the null hypothesis that all three coefficients are identical across 
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equations (p-value = 0.135). We control for the business risk of the firm by including the 
standard deviation of stock returns over the prior five years, but the corresponding coefficient 
is again estimated insignificantly. Overall, we reject the null hypothesis that cross-sectional 
differences in the amount of executive pay vanish when risk-adjusted values are used as de-
pendent variables. The high compensation level of the top 10% earners seems not solely justi-
fied by the risk inherent in their compensation package and/or their firm’s underlying busi-
ness. 
There is one final observation. Yermack (1995) claims that the range of managerial discretion 
is reduced for firms in regulated industries (e.g., utility and banking industries), and therefore 
these firms should contract lower compensation packages and less incentives from stock op-
tions. The SUR system in column III-V includes industry dummy variables, and our results 
(not tabulated here) indicate that only the dummy variable for the financial services sector is 
estimated significantly positive. This contradicts with the general perception about regulated 
industries (e.g., Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Adams and Mehran, 2003), but it can easily be ex-
plained by the two outlier financial institutions UBS and Swiss Re in our sample. 
4 Conclusions 
This paper focuses on two related implications of equity-linked compensation plans. First, it 
is well acknowledged among both academics and practitioners that Black-Scholes values 
overstate the true value of executive stock options. When opportunity costs are taken into ac-
count, stock options are an expensive way to convey pay. The Black-Scholes values provide 
an estimate of the company’s cost of granting an option, but they do not estimate the value of 
a non-tradable option to risk averse and undiversified executives. We take a Swiss perspective 
and employ the certainty-equivalence approach used by Hall and Murphy (2002) to estimate 
this value cost-wedge. We refine their setup to account for the prevailing disclosure require-
ments in Switzerland. Even for moderate relative risk aversion coefficients of 2 and 3, we 
estimate discounts of 39% and 56% relative to Black-Scholes values, respectively. In absolute 
terms, these losses translate into CHF 88 million and CHF 126 million. If we include all out-
standing option packages as of December 31, 2002, we estimate discounts of 47% and 62% 
(or CHF 290 million and CHF 377 million). Clearly, these deadweight losses appear small 
compared to the aggregate stock market capitalization of our sample firms, but with the in-
creasing use of executive stock options in Swiss compensation packages the losses will exac-
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erbate. At some point, the deadweight losses will turn out substantial and the efficiency of 
option grants becomes a major issue. 
Second, we take a closer look at the relationship between the level of total executive compen-
sation, the pay-for-performance sensitivity, and several aspects of the firm’s corporate gov-
ernance structure. The equilibrium level of executive compensation is explained by economic 
determinant variables, e.g., firm size, growth opportunities, and prior stock returns. Among 
the board and ownership variables we use, only board size is estimated significantly. Specifi-
cally, firms with a larger board of directors pay higher total compensation, indicating poten-
tially unresolved agency problems due to director free-riding and inefficient decision making 
processes within the board. In contrast, the pay-for-performance sensitivity is unrelated to 
both the economic determinant variables for the equilibrium level of pay and to our board and 
ownership variables. Although model specification problems may be an issue, this result 
could be interpreted as indication that at the moment Swiss firms do not utilize executive 
compensation efficiently. The final question we address is whether the cross-sectional differ-
ences in the level of executive pay vanish when risk-adjusted values are employed. We docu-
ment that the top 10% earners among Swiss executives receive a significantly higher compen-
sation even when we control for the risk inherent in equity-based compensation, the man-
ager’s under-diversification, and the firm’s business risk. 
Taken together, our data do not allow us to draw final conclusions. On the one hand, we find 
some evidence that firms with weaker corporate governance structures pay higher wages, po-
tentially indicating deviations from the arm’s length approach. On the other hand, our results 
are not compelling enough to provide support for the managerial power approach. We there-
fore conclude that the horse-race is still undecided. Alternatively, financial economists’ theo-
ries of optimal compensation contracts could be incomplete or incorrect, implying that our 
regression models are misspecified. Another possibility is that the data and methodology used 
in this study have inadequate power for measuring managerial incentives. With more detailed 
data and the use of panel methodology, future research will be able to provide further insight. 
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Table 1: Compensation structure in 2002 
 
 Cash Stock Options Total 
Minimum CHF 39,706 0 0 86,386 
Mean 511,392 74,152 168,431 753,975 
Median 351,500 0 20,254 410,713 
Maximum 4,929,632 2,451,385 2,498,122 8,932,520 
The table displays descriptive statistics of the value and the composition of the compensation 
package paid to the “representative” Swiss executive during the reporting year 2002. The 
sample contains 78 Swiss firms with detailed information about compensation structures for 
members of the board of directors and executive members. Executive options are valued with 
the Black-Scholes (1973) methodology, using stock prices as of year-end 2002. The volatil-
ity of a firms’ stock return is estimated using monthly data over the 1999-2002 period. All 
numbers are in Swiss francs (CHF). 
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Table 2: Description of variables 
 
Panel A: Summary of variables 
Size Natural logarithm of total sales in 2002 
Growth Market-to-book ratio as of year-end 2002 
Age Natural logarithm of years since inception as a public corporation 
Profitability 3-year average ratio of operating income to total assets (2000-2002, return on assets) 
Stock return Average annual stock return (2001-2002) 
Sigma Standard deviation of stock returns estimated from 60 monthly stock returns 
SMI 1, if the company belongs to the Swiss Market Index; 0 otherwise 
Dividend yield Annual dividend yield as of year-end 2002 
Leverage Leverage, measured as the ratio of total (non-equity) liabilities to total assets 
Lshare Percentage of voting rights exercised by the largest shareholder 
Stocksod 
Percentage of equity owned by officers and directors (if the firm has different share 
categories with different voting rights attached, nominal values of different share 
categories are used for weighting) 
Blockout Percentage of cumulated voting rights exercised by large outside investors (non-group listed companies, mutual funds, and pension funds) with >5% of voting rights 
Bsize Number of directors on the board of the company 
Ceoc 1, if the CEO is also the president of the board; 0 otherwise 
Outsider Outsider membership on the board, measured by the percentage of board seats held by non-officers without relationship to the founding family (if any) 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics 
 Mean Median Standard deviation Min./Max. 
Size 13.729 13.738 2.439 0.000/18.310 
Growth 1.800 1.455 1.317 0.450/8.440 
Age 3.462 3.450 1.255 1.386/6.277 
Profitability 0.042 0.056 0.095 -0.500/0.250 
Stock return -0.279 -0.271 0.256 -0.857/0.887 
Sigma 0.420 0.369 0.193 0.088/0.897 
SMI 0.244 0.000 0.432 0.000/1.000 
Dividend yield 0.017 0.012 0.019 0.000/0.072 
Leverage 0.238 0.225 0.167 0.000/0.666 
Lshare 0.265 0.209 0.231 0.000/0.862 
Stocksod 0.158 0.016 0.233 0.000/0.858 
Blockout 0.112 0.064 0.161 0.000/0.862 
Bsize 6.987 6.000 2.436 3.000/16.000 
Ceoc 0.192 0.000 0.397 0.000/1.000 
Outsider 0.872 0.857 0.125 0.500/1.000 
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Table 3: Regression results 
 
 Dependent variable: 
Independent 
variables: 
Market values 
(I) 
PFP-sensitivity 
(II) 
Market values 
(III) 
ρ = 3 
(IV) 
ρ = 10 
(V) 
Size 0.153*** (2.78) 
0.025 
(1.08) 
0.117*** 
(3.99) 
0.132*** 
(3.87) 
0.126*** 
(3.85) 
Growth 0.139*** (2.40) 
-0.051 
(-1.11) 
0.141** 
(2.58) 
0.088 
(1.38) 
0.103* 
(1.70) 
Age -0.134* (-1.92) 
0.001 
(0.02) 
-0.063 
(-1.20) 
-0.057 
(-0.93) 
-0.054 
(-0.91) 
Profitability 0.472 (0.66) 
-0.087 
(-0.19) 
0.493 
(0.75) 
0.736 
(0.96) 
0.742 
(1.01) 
Stock return 1.082*** (3.31) 
0.159 
(1.09) 
0.774*** 
(2.93) 
0.579* 
(1.88) 
0.487 
(1.64) 
Sigma 0.589 (1.09) 
0.201 
(0.84) 
0.332 
(0.84) 
-0.111 
(-0.24) 
-0.140 
(-0.31) 
SMI 0.097 (0.44) 
-0.099 
(-0.78) 
0.032 
(0.18) 
-0.151 
(-0.73) 
-0.162 
(-0.81) 
Dividend yield -5.623 (-1.22) 
1.447 
(0.49) 
-8.374** 
(-2.35) 
-10.002** 
(-2.41) 
-9.924** 
(-2.48) 
Leverage 0.967* (1.86) 
-0.114 
(-0.39) 
0.244 
(0.71) 
0.226 
(0.57) 
0.265 
(0.69) 
Lshare -0.312 (-0.99) 
-0.185 
(-1.34)    
Stocksod -0.147 (-0.49) 
-0.003 
(-0.02)    
Blockout -0.570 (-1.21) 
-0.097 
(-0.43)    
Bsize 0.090** (2.13) 
-0.001 
(-0.04)    
Ceoc -0.020 (-0.08) 
-0.082 
(-0.47)    
Outsider 0.042 (0.06) 
-1.613* 
(-1.85)    
Top10p   1.174*** (5.53) 
1.117*** 
(4.52) 
1.071*** 
(4.49) 
N 78 78 78 78 78 
Adj. R2 0.538 0.088 0.720 0.612 0.613 
F-test 0.000 0.139 0.000 0.000 0.000 
H0: Coefficients on Top10p in columns III, IV, and V are identical   χ2(2) = 4.01 
H0: Coefficients on Top10p in columns III and IV are identical   χ2(1) = 0.29 
H0: Coefficients on Top10p in columns III and V are identical   χ2(1) = 1.00 
H0: Coefficients on Top10p in columns IV and V are identical   χ2(1) = 2.98* 
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This table presents the regression results. Columns I and II contain the results from industry fixed effects regres-
sions of the level of executive compensation and pay-for-performance sensitivity, respectively, on the economic 
determinants and different ownership and board variables. Columns III-V presents estimates from seemingly unre-
lated regressions (SUR) of the level of executive compensation on dummy variables whether the firm’s executives 
belong to the top 10 percent in terms of total compensation using market values (column III), and risk adjusted 
values with ρ = 3 (column IV) and ρ = 10 (column V) together with a common set of economic determinant vari-
ables for the equilibrium wage. The corresponding Wald test statistics involving the coefficients of Top10p across 
equations are reported at the bottom of the table. F-tests are performed in each equation for the simultaneous sig-
nificance of all coefficients. The sample size (N) is 78 in all equations. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics 
based on robust standard errors using the White (1980) covariance matrix. */**/*** denotes statistical significance 
at the 10%/5%/1% level. 
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Figure 1: Black-Scholes values and risk-adjusted values of option packages 
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The figure shows the value of all stock options allotted in 2002 and before 2002 to the “representative” executive 
for a sample of 78 Swiss firms with detailed information about their compensation structures for members of the 
board of directors and executive members. The first bar shows the Black-Scholes (1973) (opportunity) cost in-
curred by the company, using 2002 year-end stock prices. The risk-adjusted values of the option packages for an 
executive in the remaining bars are estimated using the certainty equivalent approach proposed by Hall and 
Murphy (2002). The certainty equivalent is defined as the amount of riskless cash compensation the executive 
would exchange for the option. Assuming the executive has an initial wealth of the greater of CHF 5 million or 
four times yearly compensation, a differential equation is solved numerically, using power utility (with constant 
relative risk aversion, labelled as ρ, between 1 and 10) and a lognormal distribution of stock prices in T with 
volatility σ and expected value rf + β rm − rf( )−σ 2 2( )⋅ T , where rf = 4.5% and (rm − rf) = 5.5%. The volatility of 
a firms’ stock return, σ, is estimated using monthly data over the 1999-2002 period. A firm’s beta, β, is esti-
mated from a market model regression over the same time window. 
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Figure 2: Value of total compensation in 2002 
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The figure shows the aggregate value of total executive compensation (including cash compensation, stock, and 
stock option allotments) paid in 2002 by a sample of 78 Swiss firms with detailed information about their com-
pensation structures for members of the board of directors and executive members. The market value is com-
puted with the Black-Scholes (1973) methodology to value stock options, using 2002 year-end stock prices. The 
risk-adjusted values of the compensation packages are estimated using the certainty equivalent approach pro-
posed by Hall and Murphy (2002). The certainty equivalent is defined as the amount of riskless cash compensa-
tion the executive would exchange for the option. Assuming the executive has an initial wealth of the greater of 
CHF 5 million or four times yearly compensation, a differential equation is solved numerically, using power 
utility (with constant relative risk aversion ρ = 2 or ρ = 3) and a lognormal distribution of stock prices in T with 
volatility σ and expected value rf + β rm − rf( )−σ 2 2( )⋅T , with rf = 4.5% and (rm − rf) = 5.5%. The volatility of a 
firms’ stock return, σ, is estimated using monthly data over the 1999-2002 period. A firm’s beta, β, is estimated 
from a market model regression over the same time window. 
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Figure 3: Value of option packages outstanding in 2002 
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The figure shows the aggregate value of all executive options outstanding as of year-end 2002 for a sample of 78 
Swiss firms with detailed information about their compensation structures for members of the board of directors 
and executive members. The market value of the options is computed with the Black-Scholes (1973) methodol-
ogy, using 2002 year-end stock prices. The risk-adjusted values of the compensation packages are estimated 
using the certainty equivalent approach proposed by Hall and Murphy (2002). The certainty equivalent is defined 
as the amount of riskless cash compensation the executive would exchange for the option. Assuming the execu-
tive has an initial wealth of the greater of CHF 5 million or four times yearly compensation, a differential equa-
tion is solved numerically, using power utility (with constant relative risk aversion ρ = 1 or ρ = 2) and a log-
normal distribution of stock prices in T with volatility σ and expected value rf + β rm − rf( )−σ 2 2( )⋅T , where rf = 
4.5% and (rm − rf) = 5.5%. The volatility of a firms’ stock return, σ, is estimated using monthly data over the 
1999-2002 period. A firm’s beta, β, is estimated from a market model regression over the same time window. 
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1 Bebchuk and Fried (2004) provide an up-to-date survey of the literature. 
2 We analyze a sample of Swiss firms. Until now the Swiss accounting laws do not oblige firms to report stock 
options as an expense in their income statement. As far a tax issues are concerned, stock options are generally 
taxable upon exercise in Switzerland. For a detailed description of the current tax regulation in Switzerland see 
Rüdisühli and Orler (2005). 
3 See Meulbroek (2001), p. 7. 
4 Jensen and Murphy (1990) report that for every $1,000 change in a company’s market value in a given year, 
the average CEO’s total compensation for that year changed by three dollars. Hall and Liebman (1998) find that 
the pay-for-performance link had jumped almost tenfold since 1980; this change can be almost entirely attributed 
to the proliferation of stock options. 
5 Carpenter (2000) and Cohen, Hall, and Viceira (2000) document that options do not strictly induce excessive 
managerial risk taking. 
6 Restricted stock can be viewed as another example for a security with limited resale provisions, i.e., they can 
only be sold after a certain holding period. Silber (1991) documents that restricted stock is sold at an average 
price discount of roughly 34 percent. The discount is related to the size of the restricted offering relative to total 
shares outstanding as well as the credit-worthiness of the issuing company. 
7 Bettis, Bizjak, and Lemmon (2001) document that managers use zero-cost collars and equity swaps to hedge 
the risk associated with their equity holdings. Managers even possess some timing abilities, i.e., they initiate 
hedging transactions immediately following large price run-ups and prior to poor earnings announcements. 
8 In an earlier paper, Bebchuk et al. (2002) also suggest a „skimming view“, where the rise in executive com-
pensation purely reflects managerial entrenchment. Managers attempt to change outrage costs and search for new 
means of camouflage. High-powered incentives are only an excuse used by the management to justify higher 
rent extraction. 
9 See Leland and Pyle (1977). 
10 Deadweight losses arise because in theory firms could issue the same options to outside investors. A caveat is 
that they would clearly not receive the unadorned Black-Scholes values due to the complicating features of ex-
ecutive options such as vesting periods or inalienability. 
11 See SWX-Directive on Information Relating to Corporate Governance, p. 24. 
12 Note that our analysis includes both executive and non-executive directors because it is also common for the 
latter group to receive of share options. In 2002, 44.4% of Swiss firms allotted options to their top management 
and 27.1% to their non-executive directors on the board. For aggregate option holdings in our sample, the figures 
are 56.5% and 43.5% for executive and non-executive directors, respectively. 
13 Out of the 62 companies with incomplete data, 15 are not covered by Datastream and another 15 are small 
companies, e.g., mountain railways or public utilities, which have a business year ending other than December 
and did not provide an annual report that includes the newly required corporate governance section at the time of 
data collection. The remaining 32 firms were excluded for various reasons. In most cases the annual report was 
either not available or the section on executive compensation was missing. Most of these 62 companies are very 
small (with a market capitalization below CHF 100 millions) and still have no option programs in place as of 
today. Therefore, they would have been excluded from our sample even if data availability was no problem. 
14 These options are so called quanto options and cannot be valued using the Black-Scholes (1973) or the Hall-
Murphy (2002) methodology. 
15 In results not shown here we find that this assumption does not qualitatively change our empirical results. 
16 See Hall und Murphy (2002), p. 9. 
17 It is „public knowledge“ that Daniel Vasella, the CEO of Novartis, and Marcel Ospel, the chairman of UBS, 
earn significantly more than the maximum number (CHF 8,932,520) in table 1. We do not have access to indi-
vidualized compensation data and compute averages at the firm level. Therefore, the individualized compensa-
tion figures ought to be much more skewed than those presented in table 1. 
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18 See Holmström and Tirole (1993), Burkart et al. (1997), and Chidambaran and John (1999) for theoretical 
work on the interaction between monitoring of managers and incentive compensation. Monitoring in these mod-
els is by the stock market, outside investors, and institutional investors, respectively. 
19 In our analysis we treat board and ownership structures as exogenous, even though theory would suggest that 
they are endogenous. However, a crucial problem in empirical work is the choice of proper instrumental vari-
ables. Our regression results are potentially affected by a simultaneous equation bias (e.g., see Agarwal and 
Knoeber, 1996; Himmelberg et al., 1999; Beiner et al., 2006), but weak instruments can lead to a larger inconsis-
tency in the instrumental variables estimate than in the OLS estimate (e.g., Bound et al., 1995). 
20 See Börsch-Supan and Köke (2002) for a more general analysis of omitted variables problems in empirical 
corporate governance research. 
21 In unreported tests, we additionally included dummy variables whether the firm is diversified at the 2-digit 
(4-digit) SIC code level to proxy for the complexity of the firm. However, the coefficients were statistically 
insignificant while all other results remained basically unchanged. 
22 See Smith (1996) and Gillian and Starks (2000) for a more general discussion about shareholder activism of 
institutional investors. 
23 Using Swiss data, Beiner et al. (2006) cannot confirm Yermack’s (1996) finding of an inverse relationship 
between board size and firm value, as measured by Tobin’s Q. 
24 Note that the delta of cash and stock are 0 and 1, respectively. Our results remain unchanged when the option-
grant sensitivity instead of the total pay-for-performance sensitivity is used as the independent variable. 
25 While the use of market values as dependent variables may lead to endogeneity problems, this should not be 
an issue for risk-adjusted values due to changes in the composition of the portfolio of the top 10 percent earners. 
26 See already Baker et al. (1988). However, managers may also choose size endogenously through merger and 
acquisition activities as a takeover deterrent, allowing them to pay higher wages. 
27 The empirical results in Smith and Watts (1992) suggest that executive compensation increases with firm risk. 
According to theory, however, the direction of influence of firm risk on the level of expected compensation is 
ambiguous (e.g., Banker and Datar, 1989), which may explain why firm risk (Sigma) is estimated insignificantly. 
28 A caveat is that our results are subject to the assumptions that there are no omitted economic determinant 
variables and that ownership and board variables are exogenous. Core et al. (1999) show that the predicted ex-
cess compensation based on ownership and board variables is negatively related to subsequent firm performance. 
This suggests that these variables are proxies for the degree of managerial entrenchment rather than coinciden-
tally picking up misspecifications in the model for the equilibrium level of pay. 
29 Calculated as e1.17-1≈2.22. 
